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Abstract
Introduction: Understanding clinical reasoning is essential for patient care and
medical education. Dual-processing theory suggests that nonanalytic reasoning
is an essential aspect of expertise; however, assessing nonanalytic reasoning is
challenging because it is believed to occur on the subconscious level. This
assumption makes concurrent verbal protocols less reliable assessment tools.
Methods: Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to explore the neu-
ral basis of nonanalytic reasoning in internal medicine interns (novices) and
board-certified staff internists (experts) while completing United States Medical
Licensing Examination and American Board of Internal Medicine multiple-
choice questions. Results: The results demonstrated that novices and experts
share a common neural network in addition to nonoverlapping neural
resources. However, experts manifested greater neural processing efficiency in
regions such as the prefrontal cortex during nonanalytical reasoning. Conclu-
sions: These findings reveal a multinetwork system that supports the dual-pro-
cess mode of expert clinical reasoning during medical evaluation.
Introduction
Clinical reasoning entails the cognitive processes that cul-
minate in a diagnosis and treatment plan, and thus is
central to almost everything a physician does in practice
(Higgs et al. 2008). The “hidden” nature of clinical rea-
soning renders it difficult to assess through current meth-
ods in medical education (Higgs et al. 2008; Schuwirth
2009).Without the ability to directly observe clinical rea-
soning, a major emphasis of research in clinical reasoning
has been the development and testing of theory. Presently,
dual-process theory is the leading cognitive theory that
has been applied to the construct of clinical reasoning
(Norman and Eva 2010). This theory attributes expertise
in clinical reasoning to greater use of nonanalytic reason-
ing, which is believed to be immediate, largely subcon-
scious, and thus difficult or perhaps impossible for
subjects to describe (e.g., fast thinking or pattern recogni-
tion; Norman and Eva 2010). While medical practitioners
regularly use both analytic and nonanalytic reasoning in
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clinical reasoning tasks, nonanalytic reasoning is believed
to correlate most strongly with expertise, yet it is also the
more challenging to evaluate (Schmidt and Boshuizen
1993). However, novel neuroimaging techniques may be
particularly well-suited to this task.
Cognitive expertise involves chunking of information,
or assembling a string of perceptual cues into a more
meaningful pattern (de Groot 1965), relying on processes
such as working memory (Boreham 1994). Experts are
able to generate better problem representation as well as
better “next steps or moves” (Simon 1990) in order to
select the best diagnostic option (Elstein et al. 1990).
Thus, experts differ from novices in how they process
information and arrive at an answer, such that experts do
not choose more next steps or answers, but the quality of
their answers or next steps are superior (Elstein et al.
1990).
In medical education research, think-aloud protocols
are a commonly employed means for assessing thought
processes while engaging in an activity such as clinical
reasoning. Think-aloud method is thought to provide
insight into the underpinnings of expertise in physicians
(Boreham 1994). However, scholars disagree on the valid-
ity of verbally reporting one’s thoughts (i.e., think-aloud
protocols), because it may interfere with the very act of
thinking (Russo et al. 1989; Ericsson 2006). Moreover,
think-aloud protocols would be expected to perform bet-
ter in the assessment of consciously accessible thought
processes that are inherent to analytic reasoning (where
one actively compares and contrasts options), as opposed
to the subconscious processes of nonanalytic reasoning
that are believed to be the mainstay of experts engaged in
clinical problem solving.
One of the current “gold standards” for assessing the
end result of clinical reasoning is multiple-choice ques-
tions (MCQs) from professional regulatory authorities
such as the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM)
and National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME). The
scores from such high-stakes MCQ tests have evidence of
high reliability and validity and allow sampling of a large
number of topics during an examination session. MCQs
can also isolate tasks such as identifying the most likely
diagnosis or the next step in diagnosis or therapy, provid-
ing a useful assessment of clinical reasoning, particularly
when the questions are vignette-based and require consid-
eration of the optimal diagnosis or treatment. (Schuwirth
et al. 2001). However, as MCQs do not allow investiga-
tors to observe the thought processes that lead to the final
answer, an inability to elucidate the process of clinical rea-
soning can be viewed as a significant limitation.
Given that immediate vocalization of nonanalytic rea-
soning is difficult, if not impossible, there is a need for
other investigative methods to understand this essential
aspect of expertise. Functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) is a particularly promising method for
enhancing the understanding of nonanalytic reasoning
and development of medical expertise, especially when
viewed in conjunction with educational theory. fMRI can
elucidate otherwise invisible patterns of regional brain
activation, acting like a flashlight allows us to see the
brain areas and pathways that are inherent to clinical
problem solving. Similar assessments in other fields indi-
cate that regions such as the caudate and precuneus
appear to play an important role in generating and utiliz-
ing perception units or “chunks” when determining the
next “best move” in board games, for example, (Wan
et al. 2011). There is also some evidence that more skilled
or experienced individuals (e.g., experts) demonstrate
more efficient neuronal utilization than novices con-
fronted with the same tasks (Neubauer and Fink 2009).
Thus, taking into account both dual-process theory and
relevant neuroimaging experience, we compared brain
activation patterns for novice and expert physicians in
order to discern whether clinical reasoning expertise cor-
relates with distinct activation patterns on functional neu-
roimaging. We hypothesized that experts and novices
would display a shared network of clinical reasoning
expertise, as expertise is an adaption built on the founda-
tion developed while one is a novice. Second, extrapolat-
ing from other fields, we hypothesized that neural areas
such as the precuneus and caudate would demonstrate
greater activation in experts as opposed to novices during
nonanalytic reasoning. Lastly, the notion of neural effi-
ciency is reportedly a hallmark of skill and expertise
(Neubauer and Fink 2009); thus, we hypothesized that
experts would display less overall brain activation (more
efficient networks activated to accomplish the task) than
novices.
Material and Methods
Participants
Following completion of written informed consent,
board-certified internal medicine attending physicians
(experts) and internal medicine interns (novices) with
faculty appointments at the Uniformed Services Univer-
sity (USU) participated in the study. Board certification
represents the culmination of expertise in medicine and is
the culmination of years of medical school and residency
education. Hence, we defined board-certified physicians
as experts in this study; whereas internal medicine interns,
who just completed medical school and were several years
away from board certification, were defined as novices.
There were several exclusion criteria: presence of shrapnel
or surgical metal devices, inability to complete an fMRI
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due to anxiety or claustrophobia, taking calcium channel
blockers (which can impact regional blood flow), or preg-
nancy. The study protocol and procedures employed were
approved by the Institutional Review Boards of the USU
and Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The procedures
followed were in accordance with the ethical standards of
the responsible committee on human experimentation
(institutional and national) and with the Helsinki Decla-
ration of 1975, as revised in 2008.
Demographics
The mean age of the experts was 39.5  7 (range = 32–
51 years), including 15 men and two women. For the
novices, the mean age was 29.6  2 (range = 28–
35 years), including seven men and three women. Experts
were significantly older, and had significantly greater years
of clinical experience, than novices (P < 0.05).
Measurements
Multiple-choice questions
We used validated MCQs from the ABIM and NBME to
assess physician performance. These organizations are
responsible for certifying or licensing physicians in the
United States, and they conduct validity studies to assess
the appropriateness of their items by subjecting them to a
rigorous internal content review and performance analysis.
We selected cardiology and rheumatology questions for
the study, as they represent core domains in internal med-
icine. The MCQs ask “What is the most likely diagnosis?”,
necessitating integration and synthesis of data to answer
(i.e., the examination items assessed clinical reasoning).
Each participant answered 32 questions: 16 NBME items
(United States Medical Licensing Examination [USMLE]
Step 2 Clinical Knowledge items) and 16 ABIM items
(Maintenance of Certification [MOC]). We selected ques-
tions that fit on a single screen and contained only words
(i.e., no chest X-rays or other images). In addition, the
MCQ format (participants pushed handheld buttons for
answer options “A” to “E”) made them ideal for use in
the fMRI scanner, eliminating the need for participants to
speak, as jaw motion impairs fMRI image interpretation.
fMRI Data acquisition
Subjects were scanned on a 3T 750 MRI scanner (General
Electric, Milwaukee, WI) with a 32-channel head coil.
Acquisitions were performed using an echo-planar imag-
ing (EPI) sequence of 40 contiguous sagittal slices per
brain volume (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 25 ms, flip
angle = 60° slice thickness = 4.0 mm). In-plane resolu-
tion was 3.75 9 3.75 mm (64 9 64 voxels). An fMRI
task presentation of the 32 questions was created using
E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) and
displayed via a goggle system (Nordic NeuroLab Inc.,
Milwaukee, WI) while each participant was in the fMRI
scanner. The questions were presented in random order
for each subject over the course of four fMRI acquisition
runs, with eight questions per run. The mean run length
( standard deviation) was 392  62 sec. During the
same imaging session, a high-resolution T1-weighted
image was acquired for anatomical reference (three
dimensional GRE; TR = 6.6 ms, TE = 2.5 ms, flip
angle = 12°). This image consisted of 312 sagittal slices
with a slice thickness of 0.6 mm and an in-plane resolu-
tion of 0.468 9 0.468 mm (512 9 512 voxels). For vo-
xel-wise analysis on whole brain data, we controlled false
positive rates per map at alpha=0.05, using random-
effects models and consistent with prior work.
Procedure
Before entering the fMRI scanner, participants were for-
mally trained in procedures for answering MCQs in the
scanner. Each MCQ was projected in three phases. In the
first phase, the stem (question) appeared (“reading” phase),
ending with “what is the most likely diagnosis?” or a related
diagnostic question, but not displaying answer options “A”
to “E”. Each participant was given a maximum of 60 sec to
read the stem, or could push any button to move on to the
answer options (the second or “answering” phase) more
quickly. Participants were then given 7 sec to choose an
answer option using the finger response items. The final
“reflection” phase ensued, in which participants were
instructed to silently reflect on how they arrived at the
diagnosis utilizing analytical reasoning processes (“how did
you establish the diagnosis for this item?”), which they did
for 14 sec, before the next question was presented. The
reflection phase thus was characterized by analytic thinking
about how they chose the answer they did (e.g., actively
comparing and contrasting alternatives). Before entering
the scanner, participants received training on how to ana-
lyze their thinking (a think-aloud procedure).
fMRI Data analysis
All fMRI data were processed using the AFNI software
package in accordance with previously published methods
(Cox 1996; Durning et al. 2012). The participant’s EPI
scans were preprocessed by first removing the three vol-
umes (6 sec) from each 4D time series. Next the scans
were corrected for slice timing and motion then coregis-
tered to the T1 anatomical image (anatomic scans were
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registered to Talairach space). The images were spatially
smoothed using 8-mm full-width at half-maximum Gauss-
ian kernel and converted to percent-change-from-mean.
For the first level analysis, the four datasets for each sub-
ject were concatenated. The “answer” times varied from
question to question (depending on how quickly the par-
ticipant answered) and were modeled with a gamma-vari-
ate function with variable duration and variable relative
amplitude (amplitude variation was based on duration
variation). The “reflection” time was constant at 14 sec
and was modeled with a nonvariable gamma-variate. The
GLM analysis determined the significance of these model
time courses, along with head motion parameters, to gen-
erate b coefficients and t statistics for each voxel, for the
contrast of interest: answer phase relative to reflection
(answer > reflection) which isolates nonanalytical reason-
ing: answering (utilizing both analytical and nonanalytical
reasoning)—reflection (analytical reasoning)(Chen et al.
2012). Second-level analysis across all subjects was then
performed using linear mixed-effects modeling conducted
on the individual contrast for experts and novices sepa-
rately. These comparisons were used in the conjunction
analysis (Price and Friston 1997) to examine brain regions
with similar levels of activation, versus those with signifi-
cantly different levels of activation, between the two
groups for answer > reflection. Results of the second-level
analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons using
family wise error (FWE) correction (from a Monte Carlo
simulations using AFNI’s 3dClustSim) to achieve cor-
rected P values (P < 0.05) based on cluster size.
Results
fMRI Conjunction analysis
Whole brain analysis revealed a common network, with
similar levels of activation, between the two groups
involving the bilateral precentral gyrus, bilateral middle
frontal gyrus, bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(DMPFC), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
bilateral postcentral gyrus, bilateral inferior parietal lob-
ule, left superior parietal lobule, left precuneous, left mid-
dle temporal gyrus, and left fusiform gyrus (Table 1,
Fig. 1). Areas of significantly greater activation in experts
were the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), left
lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), right superior parietal
lobule, right inferior occipital gyrus, bilateral middle
occipital gyrus, bilateral insula, bilateral lentiform nucleus,
bilateral dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral
cerebellum, bilateral thalamus, and bilateral parahippo-
campal gyrus. The sole area in which novices demon-
strated significantly greater activation than experts was
the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (Table 1, Fig. 1).
fMRI Direct group comparisons
When directly comparing experts and novices for the
magnitude of differences between the two groups, experts
demonstrated significantly less activation relative to nov-
ices in the right postcentral gyrus, bilateral DLPFC,
DMPFC, bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral
lateral OFC, bilateral medial OFC, ventral ACC, and dor-
sal ACC. Significantly greater activation in experts com-
pared to novices was evident in the rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex and cuneus. (Table 2, Fig. 2).
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to utilize func-
tional neuroimaging to study nonanalytic reasoning dur-
ing evaluation in the field of medicine. We explored the
functional neuroimaging of expert and novice perfor-
mance using the current gold standard for competency
assessment, validated, vignette-based MCQs. We report
that novices and experts share a common neural network,
but also show some significant differences in regional
brain activation, during nonanalytical reasoning
(Fig. 1). Experts demonstrate neural-processing efficiency
in regions such as the prefrontal cortex (Fig. 2), which
may buttress dual-process theory, and help to elucidate
neural networks that represent expertise. This may ulti-
mately enable the identification of fMRI biomarkers of
effective clinical reasoning, which could facilitate educa-
tional interventions to improve desired regional brain
activation in order to reduce cognitive errors.
Shared network
The results support our hypothesis that experts and nov-
ices share a common network of activation. Experts and
novices demonstrate similar levels of activation in the
motor (BA4) and premotor (BA6) regions postulated to
be critical to clinical reasoning (Fletcher and Carruthers
2012). The DMPFC and left lateral DLPFC both also
showed similar activation levels for both groups. The
former is reportedly involved in self-referential evaluation
(Northoff and Bermpohl 2004), which may be critical in
understanding and making inferences (Amodio and Frith
2006), in turn contributing to nonanalytical information
processing. The latter is thought to be involved in atten-
tion shifting and control, selection (Sylvester et al. 2003)
modulation of self-control (Figner et al. 2010), and cogni-
tive flexibility (Braver et al. 2009).
We also found some posterior brain regions that were
active in both groups. The inferior parietal lobule is
involved in the validation of deductive reasoning, and the
fusiform may mediate the integration of information with
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a working premise (Fangmeier et al. 2006). The postcen-
tral gyrus has been shown to be connected with mental
preparation for successful problem solving (Tian et al.
2011). We expected the precuneus to show greater
activation in experts, but identified similar activations in
both groups, suggesting that even novices were employing
some pattern recognition, or nonanalytic reasoning
in answering. This is not entirely surprising, as our
“novices” have completed both college and medical
school, and are currently engaged in postgraduate medical
education, so that they are not entirely new to the field.
This may represent an intermediate step in the develop-
ment of expertise, as experts also demonstrate distinctive
features during nonanalytical reasoning (see next section).
Expert patterns
Among the regions in which experts evince greater activa-
tion is the VLPFC, which mediates working memory
retrieval (Wolf et al. 2006). The left VLPFC has been
implicated in cognitive control of memory including task
switching, knowledge-based retrieval, integration of past
events, and resolution of task interference (Badre and
Wagner 2006), whereas the right facilitates the update of
Table 1. Peak activations during nonanalytic reasoning.
Region Experts Novices
Ans>Refl Brod. no. Hemi x y z t score Hemi x y z t score
Precentral Gyrus* BA4 L 36 17 60 5.8 L 37 23 59 3.0
R 40 19 54 8.1 R 37 20 54 4.8
Middle Frontal Gyrus* BA6 L 21 3 56 7.0 L 28 7 57 5.1
R 30 9 58 6.7 R 26 9 56 4.5
Medial Frontal Gyrus (DMPFC)* BA8 L 2 16 48 6.7 L 11 4 48 4.8
R 1 5 51 5.9 R 11 15 43 3.0
DLPFC* BA9 L 47 28 29 9.8 L 49 6 37 3.9
DLPFC* BA46 L 43 30 23 8.2 L 40 20 23 3.2
IFG(VLPFC) BA45 L 52 7 23 6.2
R 54 10 24 5.4
OFC (lateral) BA47 L 31 28 4 7.1
Postcentral Gyrus* BA3 L 40 22 55 6.3 L 41 27 56 2.9
R 47 23 48 9.1 R 39 27 54 4.3
Inferior Parietal Lobule* BA40 L 36 39 48 6.7 L 40 40 44 4.0
R 32 42 50 6.8 R 33 42 50 4.0
Superior Parietal Lobule* BA7 L 28 53 58 5.5 L 28 63 55 5.5
R 27 55 51 4.2
Precuneus* L 28 68 37 5.9 L 23 60 48 4.9
Middle Temporal Gyrus* BA39 L 29 65 30 5.1 L 28 58 28 3.4
Fusiform* BA37 L 40 56 8 6.3 L 46 50 10 3.2
R 29 41 15 4.1
Inferior Occipital Gyrus BA19 R 43 77 4 4.8
Middle Occipital Gyrus BA39 L 44 76 14 4.0
R 32 82 14 3.7
Insula BA13 L 29 16 14 5.3
R 29 25 10 5.9
Lentiform Nucleus L 17 5 3 5.7
R 11 4 0 5.7
Dorsal ACC BA32 L 3 20 40 5.6
R 5 19 40 5.3
Ventral ACC BA24 L 22 6 43 3.6
Cerebellum L 17 54 28 5.8
R 26 61 30 4.9
Thalamus L 7 17 7 4.8
R 6 17 8 4.9
Parahippocampal Gyrus L 34 36 10 3.4
R 33 38 9 3.9
Nonanalytic reasoning (Answering > Reflection) in experts (left panel) and novices (right panel). Asterisk (*) denotes regions of similar levels of
activation as revealed by conjunction analysis. Brodmann’s areas and laterality (hemisphere) are provided in addition to coordinates given in Talai-
rach space. All results are based on FWE correction P < 0.05 and t scores are indicated.
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action plans which may be part of the automaticity of
expertise. (Levy and Wagner 2011). Experts also differen-
tially activate the lateral OFC, which may prepare for out-
come changes (Windmann et al. 2006) that contribute to
decision making (Kringelbach 2005). This region may
thus facilitate connections between prestored knowledge
and the new clinical scenario.
Experts demonstrate greater activation in several
regions that may orchestrate the “chunking” or pattern
recognition believed to be integral to nonanalytic reason-
ing, including the inferior occipital gyrus, middle occipital
gyrus (Ruff et al. 2003) and parahippocampal gyrus (Agu-
irre et al. 1996). On the other hand, we believe that dif-
ferential expert activation of the insula, a region involved
in the integration of sensory information (Medford and
Critchley 2010) as well as empathy, emotion, and the pro-
cessing of uncertainty (Singer et al. 2009), may be a man-
ifestation of the “gut instinct” that comes from
experience. Our experts also showed greater recruitment
of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, a region reportedly
involved in conflict resolution during error detection
(Braver et al. 2001). The ACC processes cognitive and
affective representations, in addition to sensory and
motor information, in order to evaluate error (Bush et al.
Figure 1. Whole brain analysis of experts
and novices during nonanalytic clinical
reasoning (answering > reflection). Axial
slices with corresponding Talairach
coordinates indicate unique and shared
activation patterns for experts and novices.
The results demonstrate nonoverlapping
activations for experts in blue and
nonoverlapping activation for novices in
green. The activations shared by both
groups are represented in red. All results
are thresholded at FWE corrected P < 0.05.
Table 2. Direct comparison between experts and novices (answer > reflection).
Region Brod. no.
Expert Novice
Hemi x y z t score Hemi x y z t score
Ans > Refl
Postcentral Gyrus BA1 R 56 16 48 2.95
DLPFC BA9 L 48 28 28 3.030
DLPFC BA46 L 40 36 10 2.66 R 41 35 10 3.699
DMPFC BA9 L 8 50 36 4.295 R 15 44 27 3.037
vmPFC BA10 L 18 47 7 3.099 R 19 50 1 3.717
Ventral ACC BA24 L 8 17 22 3.500 R 4 29 13 3.77
lOFC BA47 L 28 30 4 3.110 R 26 30 2 3.05
mOFC BA11 L 16 46 10 2.460 R 24 27 12 3.179
Dorsal ACC BA32 L 8 22 20 2.96 R 6 28 22 2.76
RLPFC BA10 R 46 43 6 3.55
Cuneus BA18 R 17 84 25 2.82
Negative t scores are indicative of areas demonstrating significantly lesser activation for experts than for novices, while positive t scores reveal
areas of greater activation in experts compared to novices. Brodmann’s areas and laterality (hemisphere) are provided in addition to coordinates
given in Talairach space. All results are based on FWE correction P < 0.05.
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2000). Activation of ACC in tandem with the insula sup-
ports a recent model of multimodal integration in
response selection (Medford and Critchley 2010). Cultiva-
tion of this functional network may therefore spawn bet-
ter-informed choices and minimize diagnostic error.
Another region of unique activation in experts is the
bilateral cerebellum. Recent studies have suggested that
the cerebellum may process not only motor control but
also mediate cognitive control in the form of rule retrie-
val (Crescentini et al. 2011; Balsters et al. 2012), which
may contribute to the automaticity of nonanalytic clinical
reasoning. Although we did not find activation in the
caudate as we had predicted with experts, the lentiform
nucleus of the basal ganglia was more active. Lesion stud-
ies suggest this region is involved in drive and initiative
(Brown et al. 1997). Lastly thalamic activation suggests an
elevated intensity, alertness, and arousal (Sturm et al.,
1999) unique to experts.
Novice patterns
The ventral ACC was the only region where novices
showed greater activation than experts. The ventral ACC
is involved in the emotional response to error (Braver
et al. 2001), so this may represent an emotional response
(Etkin et al. 2011).to their greater uncertainty when chal-
lenged with MCQs.
Neural efficiency and expertise
Direct comparisons between the expert and novice group
revealed significantly less activation in frontal and selec-
tive posterior regions for the experts. The relative reduc-
tion of activity in these areas may mean that experts are
more efficiently able to incorporate these areas into their
diagnostic decisions, whereas novices require more cogni-
tive effort to accomplish this. Thus, our findings suggest
that experts may make better “first moves” because they
can more efficiently activate relevant areas of the brain
for the task of clinical reasoning.
Our results reveal relative deactivation of the DLPFC of
the experts, supporting our hypothesis. As previously dis-
cussed, the DLPFC is essential to attention shifting, work-
ing memory and inhibitory control (e.g., Glascher et al.
2012) and such neural efficiency suggests that experts
may require fewer neural resources to accomplish the task
demands. In addition, the relative reduced activation in
the DMPFC suggests experts are more efficient with refer-
ential processing (Yaoi et al. 2009), and the evaluation of
the self’s qualities within the goal of the moment (Beer
et al. 2010). The relative LOFC deactivation in experts
suggests neural efficiency when weighing outcome uncer-
tainty and probabilistic choices (Windmann et al. 2006).
In addition, the efficiency in the dorsal anterior cingulate
of the experts suggests that error evaluation requires less
effort to accomplish a high level of performance (Braver
et al. 2001). The relative reduction in the lOFC and ACC
suggests that although these regions are uniquely
recruited by experts during nonanalytical reasoning (see
Table 1), they are more efficient in processing compared
to novices.
Significant differences in several frontal regions were
only revealed during direct comparisons between the
groups. The experts demonstrated significantly less activa-
Figure 2. Direct comparisons between
experts and novices (Expert > Novice)
during nonanalytic clinical reasoning.
Warm colors denote regions where experts
demonstrate greater responses and cooler
colors reveal regions where novices
demonstrate greater responses during
nonanalytic clinical reasoning
(answering > reflection). Sagittal slices are
presented with corresponding Talairach
coordinates and all results are thresholded
at FWE corrected P < 0.05. The color bars
indicate t scores and the coronal slice
presents orientation of sagittal results.
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tion in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a
region in processing of metacognitive representations
such as outcome selection (Amodio and Frith 2006). Our
results also revealed a relative deactivation in the ventral
ACC of experts, suggesting that they require less neural
resources when affectively evaluating possible errors (Et-
kin et al. 2011). Neural efficiency is also present in the
medial OFC (Windmann et al. 2006) of the experts.
Notably, the medial OFC is also reportedly involved in
empathy and compassion (Klimecki et al. 2012), consis-
tent with the efficiency demonstrated in the postcentral
gyrus, a region that mediates advanced mentalizing about
emotion and its relationship to empathy, which lead to a
greater ability to empathize (Hooker et al. 2008). Collec-
tively, these regions are sensitive to the development of
social cognition and perhaps serve as a locus for profes-
sionalism. This could, in other words, indicate that
experts are activating examples of actual patients with
answering MCQ vignettes and thus professionalism issues
are being considered and/or incorporated into their
answers.
Not only do our results support the notion that exper-
tise is mediated by neural efficiency in terms of deactiva-
tion, but we demonstrated that such refinement also
requires selective heightened activation relative to novices.
Although we had predicted that the precuneus and cau-
date would demonstrate greater activation in experts
compared novices, our results revealed instead the rostro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) and the cuneus as
regions significantly greater in the experts. The RLPFC is
a region involved in cognitive processing of abstract,
stimulus-independent information, in addition to plan-
ning and prospective memory (Gilbert et al. 2006; Wag-
ner et al. 2006; Rubens and Zanto 2011). The right
lateralization is related to processing demands (Bunge
et al. 2009) and acts in concert with the hippocampus
during relational encoding (Wendelken and Bunge 2010).
The cuneus has been associated with reasoning (Ruff
et al. 2003), specifically deductive reasoning (Barbey and
Barsalou 2010) which may utilize visuospatial informa-
tion.
Limitations of this investigation include our relatively
small sample and the lack of a period of formal rest or
inactivity; however, as we sought to capture the construct
of reasoning, and in particular the construct of nonana-
lytic reasoning, we believe that comparing answering and
reflecting phases would result in more meaningful, task-
specific findings.
Conclusions
Implications of our work include the idea that there
may be a functional neuroimaging pattern or “locus” of
clinical reasoning expertise during educational evalua-
tion. We believe that the activation of multiple areas of
the brain is likely due to the complexity of the task
(clinical reasoning). Thus, we may also have identified a
multiregion expertise network for clinical reasoning as
both novices and experts activated the same areas during
educational evaluation, with rare exception. Due to the
complexity of clinical reasoning, it may be that such a
network is needed for seemingly effortless (or at least
more efficient) processing of complex data from patients
to arrive at a diagnosis. In addition experts had less
activation in several areas of the frontal lobe when
answering MCQs supporting the notion of neural effi-
ciency.
The differences and similarities between experts and
novices suggest that there is a core network of regions
that play a role in moving from novice to expert in
clinical reasoning. Indeed our results support a recent
review in which expertise was characterized within a
two-stage framework with decreased activity and cerebral
functional reorganization relating to chunks and knowl-
edge structure (Guida et al. 2012). This is encouraging
as it suggests that, if reproducible, future work may be
able to plot the trajectory of expert performance and
provide more specific feedback to individuals based on
the pattern of functional neuroactivation. Such develop-
ment of single subject analysis was recently discussed in
the context of clinical diagnosis (Bullmore 2012), and
although such approaches are not yet available, it has
potential to contribute to the mitigation of diagnostic
errors. In summary, our study utilized established
educational theory, two separate participant groups
(experts and novices), as well as task items (MCQs) that
have been well-validated for assessing clinical reasoning,
to provide evidence that expertise involves a distributed
and refined brain network during nonanalytical
reasoning.
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